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Introduction 
 
The fall of the Iron Curtain ushered in drastic changes in the economic and 
education systems of Eastern Europe. The transition from a centrally planned to a market 
economy affected the lifestyles and the living standards of millions of Eastern Europeans, 
who faced the transition process being endowed with education acquired under communism 
and having experienced a completely different economic system and incentive mechanisms. 
To what extent is this human capital valuable in the market economies of current Eastern 
Europe?  
The existing empirical evidence on the returns to education and experience during 
the transition gives a mixed answer to this question: while education acquired under 
communism has not suffered, labour market experience has been seriously penalized, 
mainly because of the outdated technologies adopted by state industries. This evidence 
typically covers a single country and the transition years. The substantial economic turmoil, 
negative economic growth and large labour reallocations of these years have had temporary 
as well as permanent effects on the returns to human capital. Relatively little is known 
about the late transition years and especially the period of EU accession, which is 
characterized by the progressive implementation of a functioning free market economy in 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEE from now on).  
In this paper, we ask whether education under communism is still valuable in the 
late 2000s, when most CEE countries have already entered (in 2004) or were entering (in 
2007) the European Union. Our empirical strategy compares the returns to education earned 
by a treatment group with the returns of two control groups. The treatment group consists 
of the cohorts of employees aged between 25 and 38 in 1989, who have completed their 
education under communism and reside and work in Eastern Europe. The first control 
group consists of the same age cohorts, who have been educated, reside and work in 
Western Europe. The second group is composed instead of Eastern Europeans aged 6 to 13 
in 1989, who have gone to school entirely or partly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, under 
new educational curricula and institutions. By comparing the treatment group with the first 
control group, we consider individuals operating in different labour markets but belonging   4
to the same age cohorts. The comparison of the treatment group with second control group 
considers instead individuals operating in the same labour market but belonging to different 
cohorts. 
A key tenet of the large literature which estimates the (private) returns to schooling 
is that education is correlated with ability, which is typically unobserved. Failure to account 
for this correlation yields biased estimates (see Card, 1999). In this paper, we address this 
problem by following the strategy used by Card and Rothstein, 2007. For each gender, we 
group our data by country, year of birth and year of the survey. Next, we compare males 
and females within each cell. By so doing, we difference out the common components of 
average unobserved ability. We assume that the residual gender gap is a function of 
observables, which include parental education and labour market variables. 
Using data for 22 economies in Eastern and Western Europe, we find some 
evidence that having studied under communism is penalized in the economies of the late 
2000s. This evidence, however, is limited to males and to primary and secondary education, 
and holds for eight CEE economies but not for the East Germans who have studied in the 
former German Democratic Republic. We also find that post-secondary education under 
communism yields higher, not lower, payoffs than similar education in Western Europe. 
Therefore, not all who studied under communism are penalized by the radical 
transformation of Eastern European economies. Males are affected more than females. The 
primary/secondary versus post-secondary education as well as the males versus females 
divides mirror well the industry versus services divide. While the former has been heavily 
affected by the transition from communist to free market economies, the latter largely 
benefitted and rapidly expanded.  
Finally, we find evidence that younger males in Eastern Europe, who have studied 
at least in part after communism, have higher payoffs to their education than their senior 
counterparts. This result does not square well with the view that school quality has declined 
in CEE countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall. We argue that evidence of declining 
school quality is mixed at best and suggest that the higher payoffs earned by the young are 
driven by increased demand for skilled labour in Eastern Europe.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly describes the transition from   5
communism in CEE countries, and Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. The economic 
model which guides our empirical analysis is presented in Section 3, while Section 4 is 
devoted to the description of the empirical setup. The data are introduced in Section 5 and 
the results are presented in Sections 6 to 9. In the final Section 10 we summarize and 
discuss our findings. Conclusions follow. 
 
1. Transition from Communism 
 
Under communism, planned economies in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
invested a large share of their resources in the development of heavy industry, to support a 
fast process of industrialization and modernization of a production structure traditionally 
dominated by agriculture. Workers of large metallurgical and mechanical factories were 
considered the elite of the proletarians and the vanguard of Marxism. To be able to balance 
the military power of the US, the focus on heavy industry continued for decades, sacrificing 
the production of consumption goods and the development of an advanced service sector. 
The fall of the communist regimes and the adoption of a market economy required a radical 
re-allocation of production factors away from the traditional industries. During the early 
stages of transition, CEE countries saw a dramatic fall of GDP and employment (Boeri and 
Terrell, 2002), followed by economic recovery (see Figure 1).  
CEE countries lost 22.6 of their GDP in the initial phase of output decline, which 
lasted on average 3.8 consecutive years (only 2 years in Poland, 3-4 years in Hungary, 
Czech Republic and Slovak Republic and 5-6 years in the Baltic States) (The World Bank, 
2002). In most countries unemployment stagnated at high levels for long time. The average 
unemployment rate was between 9 and 14 percent in the period between 1992 and 1999 and 
reached its peak at 14-16 percent 3-4 years after the beginning of the transition
1. Real 
wages declined by about 20 percent during the initial two transition years and then 
remained stable or slightly increased since 1991.     
Dramatic changes occurred in the structure of employment between 1989 and 1998. 
                                                 
1 The Czech Republic was an exception, with initially low unemployment rates which peaked 9 years after the 
beginning of the transition at about 10 percent.   6
On average, employment in agriculture remained stable, the employment share in industry 
felt by 10 percentage points and employment in the service sector expanded (Boeri and 
Terrell, 2002). During the same period, the share of agriculture on GDP remained at 14 
percent, industry dropped from 45 to 33 percent and services increased from 41 to 53 
percent (The World Bank 2002). From almost non-existent before the fall of the Iron 
Curtain, the private sector reached rapidly 65 percent of all employment with a peak of 80 
percent in Hungary by 1997 (Boeri and Terrell, 2002). In terms of GDP shares, CEE 
countries moved from 11 percent of GDP generated by the private sector in 1990 to 68 
percent in 1999.  
The downsizing of heavy industry caused a permanent reduction in the demand for 
unskilled labour. At the same time, the expansion of skill-intensive services (for example, 
finance, insurance and real estate, consulting, information services, tourism) dramatically 
increased the demand for more educated employees (Orazam and Vodopivec, 1997). 
Looking at the supply side, Lamo et al., 2010, suggest that the emphasis on vocational 
education in former communist countries slowed down worker mobility across sectors 
during the transition period, pushing many middle-age workers towards the exit strategy 
provided by early retirement programs put in place to facilitate the transformation of CEE 
economies. This pattern is still recognizable in the late 2000. Table 1 shows the percentage 
of individuals born between 1951 and 1964 who are retired, unemployed or disabled in 
Western and Eastern Europe during the years 2006 to 2008, more than 15 years since the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. The percentage is generally higher in CEE countries and close to 35 
percent for those with less than upper secondary education.  
In spite of the fact that education in CEE economies under communism was 
provided free of charge, and stipends were often granted to students, mental work was 
valued less than physical work and manufacturing was valued more than services. Under 
socialism, labour markets were characterized by complete job security and an egalitarian 
wage distribution. Wage grids were established, and differences between skilled and 
unskilled workers were kept small compared to Western standards (Munich et al. 2005). 
Wages were higher for blue collars, and workers in manufacturing were paid better than 
workers in services, in spite of lower average education.    7
Overall, the system encouraged students to select vocational curricula and to leave 
school after completing upper secondary education. This situation changed abruptly with 
the transition to a market economy, when the structure of incentives was progressively 
altered in favour of college and more general education
2. Table 2 compares the educational 
attainment of two groups of individuals in 2006-2008, those born in Eastern Europe 
between 1951 and 1964 (seniors), who have completed their education under communism, 
and those born in the same area between 1976 and 1983 (juniors), who have spent at least 
some time in education after the fall of communism. As a benchmark, we also show the 
educational attainment of the same cohorts in the West
3.  
When comparing seniors with juniors in the East, we find that average years of 
education are broadly similar for males (12.47 versus 12.52), but significantly higher for 
junior females (13.13 versus 12.39). We also find that the percentage of college graduates 
is higher in the younger cohorts, especially among females. Compared to Western Europe, 
the share of individuals with high school education in CEE economies is relatively high for 
both age groups (68/58 percent for junior males/females in the East against 50/43 percent in 
the West), and the share of college graduates is relatively low (18/30 percent for junior 
males/females in the East against 30/42 percent in the West). 
  
2. Review of the literature  
 
Two strands of literature are related to our study. The first examines the changes in 
the returns to schooling in CEE economies after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  The second is 
broader and focuses on cohort effects in the returns to education. The latter strand 
investigates also the hypothesis that education under communism is less appropriate for a 
market economy and should receive a lower return than post-communist education.  
                                                 
2The share of students enrolled in general education between 1989 and 1997 rose from 24 to 28 percent in 
Hungary, from 22.5 to 32.4 percent in Poland, from 17.8 to 22.1 percent in the Czech Republic and from 18.1 
to 25 percent in the Slovak Republic. 
3 We select birth cohorts so as to have individuals aged at least 25 in 1989 for the older age group and at least 
25 in 2006, 2007 and 2008 for the younger age group.   8
There is a large body of empirical evidence documenting the increase in the return 
to schooling in CEE countries during the transition period. Selected examples of this 
literature are reviewed below. Fleisher at al., 2005, consider several contributions in the 
field and conclude that returns to education increased markedly during the transition, both 
in CEE economies and in Russia. Orazem and Vodopivec, 1997, compare the wages of 
different skill groups in Slovenia before and after the transition, and find that returns to 
schooling increased sharply during the early phases of the transition. Similar results are 
obtained by Munich et al., 2005, who study the case of the Czech Republic. Andrén et al., 
2005, estimate the impact of schooling on monthly earnings from 1950 to 2000 in 
Romania. Nearly constant at about 3 to 4% during the socialist period, this impact increased 
steadily during the 1990s and reached 8.5% in the year 2000. Finally, Flabbi et al., 2008, 
use data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) covering the period 1991-
2002 and show that the estimated returns to schooling have increased mainly during the 
early transition stage, with limited changes during the period of late transition.  
Are these changes in the returns to education homogeneous or do they differ across 
different age cohorts? Card and Lamieux, 2001, suggest that cohort effects in the college 
wage gap arise when workers belonging to different cohorts are imperfect substitutes in 
production. On the supply side, and conditional on demand, large cohorts of labour market 
entrants with a given education level can command lower earnings at entry because of 
stronger competition, which is more intense when the degree of substitutability across 
neighbour cohorts is higher. On the demand side, the labour market conditions at the time 
of entry in the labour market matter, and tougher conditions prevailing at the beginning of a 
career may produce persistent negative consequences. For instance, Oreopoulos et al., 
2008, estimate that young graduates entering the labour market during a recession suffer 
significant initial earnings losses which fade away only after 8 to 10 years. In CEE 
economies, cohort effects could have emerged both because of changes in labour supply by 
educational attainment and because of the differential exposure to the transition, which 
radically modified the structure of labour demand by sector and by skills.  
Perhaps the most important determinant of cohort effects in the returns to education 
is skill-biased technical change. This type of progress increases the relative productivity of   9
skilled labour and generates a continuous upward shift in its demand (see Acemoglu and 
Author, 2010, for a recent discussion and an extension of the original model)
 4. The skill 
biased technical change hypothesis explains why the college wage premium has not 
declined over time in the US or the UK, in spite of the massive expansion of tertiary 
education observed earlier in the US and later in Western Europe (Machin and McNally, 
2007)
5.  
Only a few studies attempt to estimate cohort effects in the returns to education in 
CEE countries. Juraida, 2003, uses Czech data and finds that the returns to one year of 
education in 2002 are close to 10% for the young generation aged 24 to 44 and equal to 
8.7% for the older generation aged 45 to 61. Since the young generation includes both those 
who have completed their studies under communism and those who have studied at least in 
part after 1989, it is difficult to use these results to understand whether education received 
under communism is less suitable to a modern market economy
6.  
Compos and Jolliffe, 2007, study Hungary and argue that it is not formal education 
but experience acquired before the transition which is outdated. In the communist era, 
workers operated old technologies and followed procedures and regulations which 
disappeared in the subsequent market economy. They show that returns to general 
secondary, college and university education increased over time from 1986 to 2004, but 
were unchanged for vocational education. They also compare the returns to education 
earned by individuals aged less than or equal to 20 and more than 20 both in 1986 – before 
                                                 
4The by now classical work by Katz and Murphy, 1992, suggests that the long term dynamics in the college 
wage gap between 1963 and 1987  in the US are consistent with a linearly increasing relative demand for 
college graduates, with fluctuations largely explained by changes in the relative supply. Card and Lemieux, 
2001, argue that the increase in college wage premium the US, Canada and the UK has been largely due to the 
slowdown in the rate of growth of educational attainment that began with cohorts born in the early 1950s.  
5 In a recent contribution, Walker and Zhu, 2008, examine the college wage premium in England and Wales 
for the cohorts who studied just before and just after the quick education expansion in tertiary education 
observed between 1987 and 1993 in England, and show that the college wage premium did not change 
significantly across cohorts for both genders. Green and Zhu, 2010, confirm that the college wage premium 
remained fairly stable for both men and women over the period 1994 to 2006, but find that wage dispersion 
has increased, especially for men (see also Acemoglu and Autor, 2010, for the US). Gebel and Pfeiffer, 2010, 
use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel spanning the period 1984 to 2006 and find that the cohorts 
of “baby boomers”, who were born between 1958 and 1965 and massively participated to the education 
expansion in Germany, have the lowest average return to education at the beginning of their career (even 
compared to the more recent 1966-1973 cohort).  
6 Jurajda, 2003,  finds that returns are similarly high for workers who were aged between 11 and 17 at the 
time of the breakdown of communism.   10
the fall of the Berlin Wall – and in 2004, and find that returns are higher for the older age 
cohorts. Since the younger age group in 2004 was born in 1984 or later, it is quite likely 
that this group has been entirely educated after the fall of communism. The older age group 
includes instead both those who have studied entirely under communism and those who 
have experienced both systems. The higher returns earned by the older age group suggest 
that pre-transition education is not obsolete in the modern market economy. A potential 
problem with this interpretation is that the younger age group excludes most college 
graduates, who typically graduate after age 20. Because of this, the lower returns found for 
the younger generation could be driven by self-selection out of education and into the 
labour market. 
Munich et al., 2005, use Czech data for the period 1991 to 1996 to estimate the 
wage effects of the number of years of communist and post-communist education and find 
that years of post-communism education have a lower return than years of education under 
communism. They argue that this evidence strongly contradict the hypothesis that human 
capital acquired under communism is less appropriate for a market economy. Yet an 
alternative explanation is that the individuals with post-communist education have entered 
the Czech labour market in a phase of intense turmoil, suffering as a consequence earnings 
losses which typically fade away only after several years. To rule out this alternative 
explanation one would need to compare returns at the end of the transition period, for 
instance in the late 2000s.  
Finally, Orlowski and Riphahn, 2009, compare East and West Germany and find 
that, whilst returns to education are comparable, returns to experience are much lower in 
Eastern Germany than in Western Germany almost twenty years after re-unification. They 
argue that socialist labour market experience is of little value in the new market economy, 
but that schooling acquired in the East could still be a useful signal of innate individual 
productivity
7. Similar results have been found by Chase, 1998, for both the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, and Flanagan, 1998, for the Czech Republic.  
                                                 
7 Education in the former GDR was very selective, and only about 10 percent of all students attaining grade 
10 were admitted to high school and could attend the advanced school exam (Abitur) required to be admitted 
to a University (Riphahn and Trübswetter, 2010).   11
In summary, the available empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis that 
the education accumulated under communism is obsolete in a market economy. Yet this 
evidence is based on single CEE economies and often covers the period of early transition 
from communism, when intense economic restructuring could have altered the structure of 
returns. As argued by Machin and McNally, 2007, there is a sharp contrast between the 
large body of empirical evidence documenting the rise in returns to education occurring 
during early pro-market reforms, and the paucity of studies that consider the late transition 
of the EU accession period.  
 
3. The Model  
 
Assume that firms in each economy produce output using following production 
function 
 
ct ct N Y                     [ 1 ]  
 
where Y is output,  N  total employment in efficiency units, c the country and t the time. 
Total employment depends on male ( m N  ) and female labour ( f N ) in efficiency units, 
which are imperfect substitutes in production, and is given by  
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where   is an efficiency parameter, which varies by gender (m for males and f for females), 
country and time,  1       and    1
1  is the elasticity of substitution. Both female and 
male employment in efficiency units consists of k groups of imperfectly substitutable 
workers, who differ in their age  
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where   is an efficiency parameter,  a is age,  1 ,     m f   , and N is employment. 
  Further assume that product prices are given in the international market, and 
normalized to 1. Define g as gender (f: females; m: males). Profit maximization with 
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labour in the cell defined by gender, age, country and time. Labour market equilibrium 
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With imperfect substitutability, the real wage of each group of workers decreases when 
relative supply increases.  
In the presence of frictions or wage bargaining, nonzero unemployment emerges 























, where u is the unemployment rate. 
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                               [8] 
With wage bargaining or frictions, unemployment is positive and real wages are higher than 
in perfect competition.  
We assume that the efficiency parameter μ depends on human capital H 
 
gact gact g gact H                                                          [9] 
 
Following Willis, 1986, we model human capital as a function of years of schooling S and 
potential experience X, defined as age A minus years of schooling minus age when school 
starts   
 
gact g gact g gact X S H 2 1                                        [10] 
 
ct gact gact gact S A X                                         [11] 
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Using [10] and [11] into [9] and letting vector Y include age, the log of relative supply and 
the unemployment rate, we can write the wage equation more compactly as 
 
gact g g gact g gct gact gact S Y w          ˆ ln                                                 [12] 
 
where    g g g 2 1       and   is included in  gct  ˆ . 
The percentage increase in earnings associated to a one-year increase in years of 
schooling consists of two components: 1) the productivity of human capital  g  ; 2) the 
effect of additional schooling on human capital  g  , or “school effectiveness”. In this setup, 
returns to education can be low even when school effectiveness is high if the productivity 
of accumulated human capital is low.  
 
4. The Empirical Setup 
 
The empirical counterpart of equation [12] is  
 
gact gct gact gact g g gact g gact v S Y w           ˆ ln                 [13] 
 
where  v is an error term, which includes several components beside pure noise:   
measurement error, unmeasured group characteristics such as average ability and other 
factors which affect selection into employment. Since these components are likely to be 
correlated with measured schooling, standard ordinary least squares estimates of eq. (13) 
are bound to be biased (see for instance Card, 1999).  
  Selection into employment and positive wages is not random but varies by gender, 
age and country and with labour market conditions, which we proxy with the cell specific 
unemployment and relative labour force rates. To take selection into account, we model the 
error term  gact v , as follows 




g gact g gact P
P
u        2 1                                            [14]  
Next, we model the error term  gact   as a function of parental background FBgac and the 
residual error term  gact    
 
gact gac g gact FB                                                                     [15]   
 
Although some unobserved heterogeneity has been eliminated by aggregation, 
average unobserved abilities which are correlated with average education still remain. 
Following Card and Rothstein, 2007, we “difference out” the gender-invariant components 
of these unobserved effects by comparing males and females within the same cell (age by 
country by time). Using Δ as the “between – genders” difference operator (males minus 
females) and differencing by gender equation (13) yields 
 
act ct act mact f m act f mact f m act f act S S Y Y w                         ˆ ) ( ) ( ln   [16] 
 
where     , the vector Y includes also parental background effects FB and  g   is a 
vector of parameters  g  ,  g 1  ,  g 2  and  g  . Equation (16) associates the gender difference in 
log average wages to the difference in average years of schooling and to the years of 
schooling attained by males in the same cell. When the effect of schooling on earnings does 
not vary by gender,  ) ( f m     is equal to zero. 
  Although differencing removes common un-observables, gender specific un-
observables still remain, and could be correlated with the change and level of average 
schooling, thereby biasing standard ordinary least squares estimates. We deal with this as 
follows: first, we capture  ct  ˆ   in a flexible way by using country by year dummies  ct  . 
The inclusion of these dummies implies that the relationship between human capital and 
earnings is identified by the variation provided by different cohorts within each country and   16
wave.  
Second, we define  act ac ct act         . Since the country by time effects are 
already captured by the set of country by time dummies, we only need to worry about the 
age by country effect, which we model as follows 
 
ac a c ac GDP 1                                       [17] 
 
where  c   and  a   are country and age dummies and GDP is log real GDP per head at age 
10, which is expected to capture the average economic environment faced by the age cohort 
at the time of education.  
  These assumptions imply that equation (16) becomes 
 
act mact f m act f mact f m act ct a c act S S Y Y w f                        ) ( ) ( ln      [18] 
 
where  act act act         and  act Y  includes also the log of GDP at age 10 in addition to 
relative supply, unemployment rates and parental background














                                                [19] 
 
ordinary least squares yield consistent estimates of the relevant parameters  m   and  f  .  
  The use of country and country by year dummies allows us to control for country 
specific un-observables, both time variant and time invariant. By using age dummies we 
also control in a flexible way for differential effects of potential experience and time of 
entry in the labour market. In the empirical implementation, we estimate Eq. (18) separately 
by age group (seniors versus juniors) and by area (Eastern versus Western Europe). We 
                                                 
8 Notice that the coefficient associated to the relative population rate reflect both the elasticity of substitution 
between cohorts and the effect on selection into employment.   17
measure relative supply with relative population and the activity rate. In order to alleviate 
concerns about reserve causality affecting these variables and the unemployment rate, we 
use first lags rather than current levels. Also, due to data availability, these labour market 
variables are defined by country, year of survey and 5-year age groups.  
 
5. The Empirical Strategy and the Data 
 
  We compare the returns to education earned by the cohorts of individuals who 
completed their schooling in Eastern Europe before the fall of the Berlin Wall with the 
returns earned by two control groups: the same cohorts who completed their education in 
Western Europe, and the younger cohorts who went to school in CEE countries entirely or 
partially after 1989. The treatment group consists of individuals born between 1951 and 
1964, who were at least 25 in 1989 and have been in employment during the period 2006 to 
2008. By and large, these individuals had completed their education before the end of 
Communism in the East
9. The younger control group consists instead of individuals born 
between 1976 and 1983, who were at most 13 in 1989 and at least 25 and employed during 
the years 2006-2008. This group has been exposed at least in part to post-communism 
education. First of all, compulsory education in the East ends typically at 14 or later. 
Therefore, even the oldest in this group has spent some time at school after 1989. Second, 
more than 80 percent of those born between 1976 and 1983 in the East have completed at 
least upper secondary education and have gone to school until age 18 or later. Even if we 
place the start of the transition period in 1991, as done for instance by Flabbi et al, 2008, 
these individuals have been exposed to some extent to new education curricula and 
systems.  
  Our data are drawn from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC), a survey of living conditions in European countries which covers 
both Western and Eastern European countries. The EU-SILC is a survey of households 
based on nationally representative samples, which collects comparable cross sectional and 
                                                 
9 In our data, more than 96 percent of the individuals in the selected age cohorts declare to have attained their 
highest education before 1989.   18
longitudinal micro data on income poverty and social exclusion and contains information 
on income, housing, material deprivation, labour, health, demography and education. We 
use data from three waves (2006-2007-2008) and 22 countries: Bulgaria, The Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia in Eastern Europe 
and Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Cyprus, Spain, France, Finland, Greece, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom in Western Europe.  
  For each country in the sample, we only consider the sub-sample of individuals who 
reside in the country of birth (about 92 percent of the total in 2008). By so doing, we 
minimize the risk of assigning to individuals the wrong education system. This would 
happen if we were to assume that a person living in France but born and educated in Poland 
completed her education in the former country rather than in the latter
10. Since the 
exclusion from the sample of individuals born and educated in a country and living in 
another is impossible for Germany using EU-SILC data, we turn for this country to an 
alternative dataset, the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), which allows us to 
clearly identify whether the received education was completed in previous East rather than 
West Germany.  
  We compute years of schooling as the difference between the age when the highest 
level of education was attained and country specific information on the age when school 
typically starts. Real hourly earnings in Euro (CPI deflated) are obtained as the ratio of 
gross employee cash earnings to the number of hours worked
11. Individual data on 
schooling and earnings are aggregated into cells defined by year of birth, country, gender 
and wave. We only retain those cells that include at least 30 observations. When collapsing 
the data, we use cross sectional EU-SILC weights
12. We end up with a sample of 877 cells 
for senior males and females in both Eastern and Western Europe and 138 cells for junior 
Eastern Europeans.  
                                                 
10 If we exclude Germany and consider the 2008 wave of EU-SILC, only 3 percent of the individuals in the 
relevant age cohorts have been born in a European country different from the country of residence.  
11 We only consider individuals with at least 15 and at most 80 hours worked per week. For most countries we 
use data on gross personal income. For a few countries (Greece, Portugal and Italy), we use instead gross 
monthly earnings when data on gross personal income are missing. 
12 This restriction forces us to exclude Ireland from the sample, because almost half of the original cells are 
dropped.    19
Average years of schooling by area, gender and group of cohorts (seniors and 
juniors) are shown in Table 2. Table 3 shows instead the average real hourly gross wage by 
area, cohort and gender for the year 2006. As expected, wages are higher for males than for 
females, especially among the older cohorts, and the ratio between hourly wages in the 
West and in the East ranges from about 3.5 for the junior age group to about 4.3 for the 
older cohorts.  
Unfortunately, the EU-SILC dataset does not contain information on parental 
background. We retrieve this information for the relevant cohorts and countries and waves 
using data drawn from the European Social Survey (ESS), and measure parental 
background with the percentage of parents in the cell who have attained less than upper 
secondary education
13.  
The data for Germany are drawn from waves 2000 to 2009 of the German Socio-
Economic Panel. We retain only individuals born in Germany who have studied either in 
previous West or in previous East Germany, and measure the quantity of education with the 
years required to attain the current education level. Due to the limited number of available 
observations, our sample includes only senior individuals, who were born between 1945 
and 1964, and therefore were at most 55 in the selected sample period. We divide these 
individuals in two groups, those who have completed their education in the West and those 
who have studied in the East, independently of whether they are currently living and 
working in other parts of Germany
14. Table 4 shows the average years of schooling and the 
real average hourly wage for each group and gender in 2006. We find that senior East 
Germans have on average a slightly higher level of education than senior West Germans. 
On the other hand, the latter have higher real hourly wages. 
We also use data from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), which 
contains information both on educational attainment and on adult literacy. Literacy is 
assessed in three domains: prose literacy, or the skills needed to understand and use 
information from texts; document literacy, or the skills required to locate and use 
information contained in various formats, including payroll forms, maps, transportation 
                                                 
13 Since this information is not available for Lithuania, we drop this country from our sample. 
14 This information is contained in the variables “psbilo” and “pbbilo” in the SOEP dataset. See Haisken De 
New and Frick, 2005, for details.   20
schedules; quantitative literacy, or the skills required to apply arithmetic operations, such as 
balancing a check-book or determining the amount of interest on a loan. Since literacy test 
scores – which range in IALS from zero to 500 - are affected by adult learning and school 
quality, they can be interpreted as a broader proxy of individual (cognitive) human capital 
than the number of years of attained education (see Hanushek and Wossmann, 2009).  
The IALS survey was conducted from 1994 to 1998 and involved several European 
countries from previous Western and Eastern Europe. We restrict out attention to the 
countries which are also included in our sample drawn from EU-SILC: Belgium, Denmark, 
the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, 
Slovenia and the UK, and collapse data into cells identified by year of birth, country and 
gender. Due to the relatively few observations, we only retain cells with at least 10 
individuals. Since this restriction excludes an important number of cells for the younger age 
group, we only use literacy data for the senior age group, who in these data is defined as 
individuals born between 1940 and 1965. The average test score by gender and area 
displayed in Table 5 below shows that average literacy is higher among those educated in 
Western Europe and slightly higher among males. 
Finally, the data on country, age and gender specific unemployment rates and 
activity rates are drawn from the Eurostat database. Since these data are only available by 
age group, we select five age groups – 25-29, 30-34, 45-49, 50-54 and 55-59 and match 
these groups to the relevant cells defined by age, country and gender in the EU-SILC 
dataset.  
 
6. Senior Employees in Western and Eastern Europe   
 
We pool the 22 countries in the sample into two groups, one for Eastern and the 
other for Western Europe and compare the returns to schooling earned by the age cohorts 
who have studied under communism in the East to the returns earned by the same age 
cohorts who have studied in the West by estimating Eq. (18) separately for the two groups 
of countries. Given that we use grouped data, we weight our estimates with the square root 
of the number of individuals in each cell, and cluster standard errors by country and year of   21
birth to take into account the possibility that the error term is correlated across the three 
available waves – 2006, 2007 and 2008 - because of common year of birth by country 
effects.  
Table 6 Panel A presents our results
15. We find that the estimated returns to 
schooling are slightly higher for Eastern European females who have studied under 
communism than for equally aged Western European females: one additional year of 
schooling is expected to raise wages by 6.6% in the East and by 5.3% in the West. In the 
case of males, additional schooling raises wages by 5.4% in the West and by 5.3% in the 
East. When we test whether these differences are statistically significant, we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of no significant difference. 
These findings rely on the assumption that the relationship between log hourly 
earnings and years of schooling is linear. This is equivalent to assuming – at the individual 
level – that the returns to an additional year of post-secondary education are equal to the 
returns to primary and secondary education
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where 
H S  and 
C S  are average years of schooling in primary and secondary education and 
post-secondary education respectively. 
We compute cell specific 
H S  and 
C S  from individual data as follows: for the 
individuals who have completed at most upper secondary education (ISCED=3), 
H S  is 
equal to the number of years of schooling required to attain the highest degree and 
C S  is 
equal to zero. For the individuals who instead have completed post-secondary education, 
H S  is the country specific modal number of years of schooling required to attain upper 
                                                 
15 The full estimates are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
16 In this paper, primary and secondary education corresponds to ISCED levels 0 to 3 and post-secondary 
education to ISCED levels 4 to 6.   22
secondary education (ISCED 3; 12 years for most countries in the sample), and post-
secondary schooling is the difference between total years of schooling and this modal 
number. Cell averages are then obtained by averaging individual data over gender, country, 
wave and year of birth.  
  As shown in Panel A of Table 7, we find that the point estimates of the returns to 
schooling are generally higher for post-secondary education than for primary or secondary 
education, with the exception of senior males in Western Europe, for whom these returns 
are rather similar. In Eastern Europe, the returns earned by senior females are equal to 8.6% 
per year of schooling in post-secondary education and to 4.1% per year spent in primary 
and secondary schools. Turning to senior Eastern European males, while post-secondary 
education yields a rather high 9.8% return per year, primary and secondary education earns 
a small and negative return.  
Next consider Western Europeans: on the one hand, we find that years of primary 
and secondary education yield a 3.9 percent return for senior females and a 5.5 percent 
return for senior males. On the other hand, the returns to years of post secondary education 
are equal to 6.8 and 5.0 percent respectively. When we test whether the point estimates of 
the returns to 
H S  and 
C S  are statistically different, or whether returns earned by senior 
workers in the East are statistically different from the returns earned by senior workers in 
the West, we find that this is the case for males but not for females.  
  Our findings suggest that the answer to the question whether education under 
communism is less appropriate for a market economy than education completed in the West 
depends on the level of attained education: when we consider primary or secondary 
education, there is evidence that male employees who have studied under communism earn 
significantly lower returns in the late 2000s than employees in the same age groups who 
have studied in the West. No such evidence exists for female labour. When we turn instead 
to post-secondary education, the evidence is that returns are higher, not lower, for the 
relatively few who went to college under communism, especially if they are males.   
  In the model of Section 3, returns to schooling reflect both the productivity of 
human capital and school effectiveness. Eventual evidence that the education acquired 
under communism is less appropriate for a modern market economy than the education   23
acquired in the West or after communism can be explained by our model either with the 
former type of education being less valuable for the production of human capital, or with 
the fact that the skills learnt under communism were based on and applied to vastly 
outdated technologies, and therefore cannot be as valuable when applied to the modern 
technologies adopted more than 15 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
  Human capital has many dimensions, cognitive, non-cognitive and technical. In line 
with the relevant literature – see for instance Hanushek and Wossmann, 2009 – we measure 
the cognitive dimension with adult literacy test scores, which are standardized measures of 
prose, quantitative and document literacy. As discussed in the previous section, the IALS 
survey provides comparative data on these scores for a sub-sample of countries in Eastern 
and Western Europe. We use these data to run the following regression 
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where TS is for test scores and we only consider the senior age groups in Eastern and  
Western Europe
17. Notice that, since the IALS survey was carried out between 1994 and 
1998, the adult literacy scores refer to the initial stages of the transition process in CEE 
countries rather than to the late 2000s. 
Table 8 reports our results. We find no support for the view that an additional year 
of schooling under communism in the East has had a smaller effect on the development of 
cognitive skills in adult age than a similar year spent in the West. Quite the contrary, there 
is evidence that school effectiveness has been higher for females in the East than in the 
West. Under the assumption that the estimates in Table 8 hold also for the broader sample 
of countries in Table 6, we can use them to compute the productivity component of the 
returns to schooling - parameters ψ in Eq. (13). As shown in Table 9, this component is 
lower in the East than in the West. The difference in the estimated productivity parameter is 
sizeable for females and small for males, and statistically significant only for females.  
 
                                                 
17 We omit country by time dummies in this specification because there is only one wave for each country.    24
7. Senior Employees in Western and Eastern Germany 
 
We estimate the returns to schooling in post-unification Germany by using 10 
waves of SOEP (from 2000 to 2009) and by focusing exclusively on senior workers, who 
have completed their studies either in the previous German Democratic republic (GDR) or 
in the previous Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). We pool data from the Eastern and 
Western Lander and retain only the cells with at least 5 observations. The estimated model 
is  
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where hourly wages are monthly gross earnings divided by average monthly hours of work, 
r is the region of Germany (previous West and East) and GDR is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
individuals in the cell have completed their education in the previous GDR rather than in 
the Federal Republic (FRG). Our results are reported in Table 10. 
  In contrast to our findings in Table 7, we find that the returns to 
H S  In Germany are 
generally higher than the returns to
C S . Notice that more than 50 percent of the individuals 
in the relevant age cohorts who have attained lower or upper secondary education have 
done so by completing an apprenticeship, both in the West and in the East. This subscribes 
to the view that, at least for East Germans, even vocational education attained under 
communism is not penalized by the transition to a market economy. Furthermore, there is 
little statistical evidence that returns to schooling are lower for those who have studied 
under communism. Quite the contrary, we find that males with post-secondary education in 
the East have significantly higher payoffs to their years of schooling than males who have 
completed a similar level of education in the West. 
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8. Senior and Junior Employees in Western and Eastern Europe 
 
In this section, we compare the returns to schooling earned by two groups of 
Eastern Europeans, the seniors born between 1951 and 1964 and the juniors born between 
1976 and 1983. While the first group has completed education under communism, the 
second group has spent at least some time at school after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Panels 
B of Table 6 and 7 show the results of this comparison. When we restrict the relationship 
between log earnings and schooling to be linear and the marginal returns to schooling to be 
constant, we find that the estimated returns to schooling vary considerably by gender: in the 
case of females, junior workers earn 5.6% more for each year of education, a return close to 
the 6.6% payoff obtained by senior employed females. The difference of returns is not 
statistically significant. For males, the average hourly wage of junior employees increases 
by 11.6% for each additional year of schooling, a return more than twice as big as the one 
earned by senior employees (5.3%). In this case, the difference of returns is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level of confidence. 
When we allow returns to schooling to vary according to whether education is post-
secondary or lower, we find that the returns earned by junior female employees are not 
statistically different from the returns earned by senior females. On the other hand, junior 
male employees in the East have systematically higher returns than senior males in the 
same area. The difference is small and not statistically significant for post-secondary 
education, and large and statistically significant for primary and secondary education.    
 
9. Robustness checks   
 
We have compared the returns to education of junior and senior workers educated in 
Eastern and Western Europe by assuming that these returns are homogeneous within each 
area. Yet this restriction may not hold. We ask whether our qualitative findings still hold 
when we restrict the comparison to two groups of countries in the East and the West of 
Europe which share the same returns to education within each group. To identify these two 
groups, we estimate an augmented version of Eq. (18), which includes among the   26
regressors the interactions of country dummies with the level and the “between-genders” 
difference in years of schooling, and select the sub-sample of countries for which the 
hypothesis of no joint statistical significance of these interactions cannot be rejected. It 
turns out that we need to exclude from the sample the following countries: Cyprus, Austria 
and Sweden in the West and Romania, Estonia and Slovakia in the East. Table 11 presents 
the estimates when these countries are omitted from the comparison. We confirm the 
findings reported in Table 6 that the returns earned by senior workers in Eastern and 
Western Europe are not statistically different. We also find that the returns accruing to 
junior male workers in the East are higher than those earned by senior workers in the same 
area. We also confirm the finding that junior males educated in the East have substantially 
higher returns to education than senior males. 
In our definition of senior workers we have also included employed individuals who 
are aged between 51 and 55 at the time of the survey (2006-2008). A potential concern with 
this choice is that selection into retirement may affect average earnings and education in the 
oldest cells of the sample. To illustrate, the percentage of retired individuals is as low as 1 
percent in the cells of individuals aged below 50, and equal to 7.9 and 4.1 percent 
respectively in the cells of Eastern and Western Europeans aged 51 to 55. In our estimates, 
we control for self-selection into employment and the labour force using the country by age 
by gender values of the unemployment rate and the activity rate. As a further control, we 
replicate our estimates of Eq. (18) by considering only the year of birth cohorts between 
1956 and 1964. As shown in Table 12, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
estimated returns to education earned by senior employees are not significantly different 
between Eastern and Western Europe. We also confirm that these returns are significantly 
higher for junior than for senior males in Eastern Europe. Therefore, we conclude that 
restricting our sample to a younger group of seniors does not alter in a significant way our 
empirical results. 
    We also ask whether our estimates are affected by adding labour market 
experience, which in the EU-SILC data is defined as the number of years since the first 
regular job was started. In results available from the authors upon request, we show that 
adding the level and difference of experience to Eq. (18) does not alter our findings in a   27
qualitative way. Moreover, when we test whether the level and difference of labour market 
experience is statistically significant, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
significance
18.  
Finally, we check the robustness of our finding to two additional variations: first, 
we remove agriculture from the data; second, we exclude those individuals who have 
completed their schooling after 1987 in the senior age group and before 1990 in the junior 
age group. In both cases, results available from the authors show no qualitative changes 
with respect to the baseline results presented above. 
 
10. Summary and discussion 
 
  We have compared the returns to education of senior Eastern European workers 
with those of coetaneous Westerners and younger Easterners. Considering the former 
comparison, we have found that the pattern of returns to education changes significantly 
depending on whether we assume constant or variable returns across degrees.  If we assume 
that the returns to years of schooling do not vary with the attained degree, we find that 
estimated returns in the late 2000s for those who have been educated under communism, 
both males and females, are not significantly different from the returns earned by those who 
have studied in Western Europe. There is also no evidence that education under 
communism is less effective in developing cognitive skills and literacy in adult life than 
education attained elsewhere in Europe. Quite the opposite, the former is more effective 
when we consider senior females.  
With the notable exception of Germany, when we allow for the effects of years of 
schooling on earnings to differ depending on the attained degree, we find that the returns to 
years of primary and secondary education are significantly lower than the returns to post-
secondary education, independently of where this education was received. Moreover, the 
returns to primary and secondary education are particularly low for senior males educated 
under communism, who enjoy instead a relatively high return from their post-secondary 
                                                 
18 Notice that in all our regressions we control for year of birth dummies and for education in the cell. This is 
equivalent to controlling for potential experience.  
   28
education. Germany differs from the European countries considered in this study because 
returns to primary / secondary education are generally higher than returns to post-secondary 
education. Overall, since upper secondary (vocational) education was the bulk of education 
in the communist regimes, our evidence supports the view that the primary and secondary 
education acquired by males under communism is currently penalized in most East 
European labour markets. No evidence of such a penalty exists for females.  
  When we compare seniors and juniors in CEE countries, we observe that younger 
males earn considerably higher returns to education than more senior males. There is no 
significant difference in returns between younger and older females. Furthermore, the 
higher returns to education experienced by younger males are driven by the returns to 
primary and secondary education, which is still by and large vocational
19.  
  It is useful to contrast our results with those found in the relevant empirical 
literature. As reviewed in Section 2, this literature – and especially the contributions by 
Compos and Jolliffe, 2007, for Hungary and Munich et al., 2005, for the Czech Republic – 
does not find convincing evidence that education under communism is less valuable or 
appropriate for a market economy than education after communism. We contribute to this 
literature by using data for nine Eastern European countries – including previous East 
Germany - rather than from a single country and by examining returns more than 15 years 
after the fall of the Iron Curtain.  
We have shown that there is empirical support for the view that male primary and 
secondary education under communism is generally less valuable than the same level of 
education acquired either during the same period of time in the West or after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in the East. We have also shown that post-communist education yields higher 
returns for males than education under communism. Pre-college education under 
communism is penalized, but only for males. Why are females educated under communism 
not affected?  
One reason is that the radical transformation of the economy in CEE countries after 
                                                 
19 The share of students in vocational education declined from 82.2 to 77.9% from 1989 to 1996 in the Czech 
Republic, from 76.1 to 72.9 percent in Hungary, from 77.5 to 68.9 percent in Poland, from 81.9 to 75.9 
percent in the Slovak Republic and from 87.2 to 70 percent in Romania (World Bank, 2000).   
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the fall of the Berlin Wall affected mainly the industrial sector, where male employment 
with less than college education was heavily concentrated. If we consider senior and junior 
employees in the East and the West, we find that in the East the percentage of male 
employees working in industry during 2006-2008 was 55% and 49% respectively. This 
percentage falls to 26 and 23 percent for female employees. In the West, the share of male 
employment in industry has been much lower, at 39% for seniors and 40% for juniors.  
Senior male employees with primary and secondary education, who entered the labour 
market or were already in the market when the transition to market economies begun in the 
East, took the brunt of the recession either in terms of unemployment or in terms of lower 
wages. On the one hand, this negative cohort effect has been quite persistent and lasted 
until the end of the transition. On the other hand, and with the exception of East Germany, 
the industrial skills developed before the end of communism have become increasingly less 
suitable to the new market economies. Female labour was partly spared because it was 
mainly employed in the expanding service economies of the East. 
  The relatively low appropriateness of primary and secondary education attained 
under communism does not extend to college education. Quite the contrary, this type of 
education yields higher or as high returns as the education obtained in the West or after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. To interpret these findings, it is useful to look at demand and supply 
by education. As shown in Table 2, the percentage of individuals who have obtained a 
college degree under communism is much lower than the percentage of equally aged 
college graduates in the West, especially for males. When we compare different cohorts 
within the same area, it is clear that college education has substantially expanded, both in 
the East and in the West. This expansion has been relevant for females but moderate for 
males in Eastern Europe. In the late 2000s, the overall stock of college graduates in the East 
was still substantially below that of the West.  
  On the demand side, we have mentioned in Section 2 that the service sector 
expanded significantly in CEE countries between 1989 and 1998 both in terms of 
employment and of its share of GDP. This process continued afterwards, although at a 
slower pace. According to the World Bank (WDI indicators), the value added generated by 
services in 2008 was between 58 and 66 percent of GDP in the major CEE economies, with   30
an important expansion of  the financial sector and other skill-intensive services, following 
progressive liberalization. Most likely, the increased demand for college graduates in the 
area generated by the expansion of skill-intensive services exceeded the growth in the stock 
of graduates, which could expand mainly via higher education of the younger cohorts, 
thereby contributing to the relatively high returns to post-secondary education for senior 
and junior employees of both genders.  
  Compos and Jolliffe, 2007, find that returns for those who received their education 
post-1989 in Hungary have fallen since 1995, which they interpret as evidence of falling 
school quality. We find instead that returns for those who have studied post-1989 in eight 
Eastern European countries (including Hungary) have increased with respect to the returns 
earned by older workers, especially for men. We reconcile our findings with declining 
school quality in CEE countries by arguing that the evidence of such decline is mixed at 
best. We propose three pieces of evidence in support of our view. First, as shown in Table 
13, the share of public education expenditure on GDP has fallen during the transition in 
some countries (Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovakia) but risen in others (Poland, Romania and 
Slovenia). If we look instead at the growth of public expenditure in education during the 
1990s, we find that it has been negative only in Bulgaria (see World Bank, 2000). 
  Second, the pupil – teacher ratio in basic education has declined in all countries, 
with the exception of Estonia (see Table 14). Last but not least, the average maths test 
scores of students enrolled in the eight grade in 1999, who have spent all their time in 
school after the fall of the Berlin Wall, is above the international average in all the CEE 
countries considered in this study, with the exception of Romania (see Mullis et al, 2000). 
When compared to average maths test scores in 1995, scores in 1999 are higher in 
Hungary, more or less unchanged in Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia, and lower in 




  We  have  used    multi-country data to investigate whether education under 
communism is less valuable in the free market economies prevailing in Eastern Europe   31
around or after the accession to the European Union. We have compared the cohorts of 
individuals who have studied under communism with post-communist cohorts and with 
older cohorts who have studied in the West. We have found evidence that having studied 
under communism is penalized in the economies of the late 2000s. This evidence, however, 
is limited to males and to primary and secondary education, and holds for eight CEE 
economies but not for the East Germans who have studied in the former German 
Democratic Republic.  
  We have also found evidence that post-secondary education under communism 
yields higher, not lower, payoffs than similar education in Western Europe. Therefore, not 
all those who studied under communism are penalized by the radical transformation of 
Eastern European economies. The primary/secondary versus post-secondary divide mirrors 
well the industry versus services divide. It is the former that has been heavily affected by 
the transition from communist to free market economies.  
  Interestingly, the relative fortunes of education under communism vary with gender, 
as we find no evidence that females who studied under communism are penalized in the 
returns to their education today. Again, a plausible explanation is that since females worked 
and work mainly in the service sector, they have been spared relatively to males the costs of 
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Table 1. Percentage retired, unemployed or disabled, by educational attainment. Cohorts 
born between 1951 and 1964. By area, cohort and gender. Eastern and Western Europe. 
2006-2008. 
      
   Males  Females 
Western Europe       
  Less than high school  16.4 13.6 
  High school  10.6 10.5 
  College  5.5 5.6 
Eastern Europe      
  Less than high school  36.9 37.4 
  High school  21.5 24.0 
  College  7.5 9.6 
      





Table 2. Educational attainment: by area, cohort and gender. Eastern and Western Europe. 
2006-2008. 
              Males           Females   
    Seniors Juniors Seniors Juniors 
Western  Europe         
  Years of schooling  12.96 13.77 12.47 14.41 
  % with high school  0.45 0.51 0.42 0.44 
  % with college  0.22 0.28 0.23 0.40 
Eastern Europe        
  Years of schooling  12.52 12.47 12.39 13.13 
  % with high school  0.72 0.69 0.63 0.60 
  % with college  0.14 0.16 0.17 0.28 
        






Table 3. Real hourly gross wage: by area, cohort and gender (in euros). Eastern and 
Western Europe. 2006. 
              Males           Females   
    Seniors Juniors Seniors Juniors 
         
Western Europe  Real hourly wage  18.41 13.12 15.49 12.42 
        
Eastern Europe  Real hourly wage  4.23 3.66 3.67 3.28 
        











Table 4. Educational attainment: by area, cohort and gender. Germany 2006. Source: SOEP 
           Seniors   
   Males  Females 
Studied in West 
Germany 
    
  Years of schooling  12.41 12.81 
  Real hourly wage   21.21 17.23 
Studied in East 
Germany 
    
  Years of schooling  12.62 13.16 
  Real hourly wages  13.13 11.89 
      




Table 5. Literacy test scores: by area and gender  
           Seniors   
   Males  Females 
      
Western Europe  Test score  287.87 280.54 
      
Eastern Europe  Test score  250.05 246.13 
      
Source: our computations based on IALS data 







Table 6. Estimated returns to education. Dependent variable: Δlog hourly wage. 
 
Panel A: senior workers in the West and East 













        
Years  of  schooling  0.066 0.053 0.053 0.054 
 (0.020)  (0.009)  (0.016)  (0.010) 
 [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.002]  [0.000] 
        
Test of difference 
between East and West 
(p-value) 
[0.555]  [0.974]  
        
Observations  258 519 258 519 
 
 
Panel B: seniors and juniors in Eastern Europe 





Senior Males   Junior Males  
        
Years  of  schooling  0.066 0.056 0.053 0.116 
 (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.018) 
 [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.002]  [0.000] 
        
Test of difference 
between seniors and 
juniors (p-value) 
[0.647]  [0.004]  
  258 138 258 138 
Notes: each regression includes the level and gender difference of lagged relative population, unemployment rate and 
activity rates, country dummies, age dummies and country by year dummies. Clustered country by year of birth standard 
errors within parentheses and p-values within brackets.  
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Table 7. Estimated returns to years of schooling  H S  and  C S . Dependent variable: Δlog hourly 
wage. 
Panel A: senior workers in the West and East 
        








Years of schooling  H S   0.041 0.039  -0.022  0.055 
 (0.030)  (0.014)  (0.026)  (0.015) 
 [0.174]  [0.006]  [0.390]  [0.000] 
        
Test of difference between 
East and West (p-value) 
[0.936]  [0.010]  
             
Years of schooling  C S   0.086 0.068 0.098 0.050 
 (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.021)  (0.013) 
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
        
Test of difference between 
East and West (p-value) 
[0.454]  [0.021]  
 
Test of difference between  










Observations 258  519  258  519 
Panel B: senior and junior workers in the East 
  Senior Females  Junior Females  Senior Males  Junior Males 
Years of schooling  H S   0.041   0.009 -0.022 0.105 
 (0.030)  (0.040)  (0.026)  (0.041) 
 [0.174]  [0.821]  [0.390]  [0.013] 
        
Test of difference between 
East and West (p-value) 
[0.465]  [0.010]  
             
Years of schooling  C S   0.086 0.063 0.098 0.119 
 (0.022)  (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.024) 
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
        
Test of difference between 
East and West (p-value) 
[0.328]  [0.460]  
 
Test of difference between  










Observations  258 138 258 138 
Notes: see Table 6   37
Table 8. The Effect of Years of Schooling on log Human Capital. Senior workers 












      
Years of Schooling   0.066 0.027 0.027 0.026 
  (0.012) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.008] [0.000] 
      
Test of difference between 
East and West (p-value) 
[0.000]  [0.975]  
      
        
Observations 90  172  90  172 
Notes: each regression includes country and age dummies. Clustered country by year of birth standard errors within 





Table 9. The productivity of human capital: by area and gender. Senior workers only. 












H    0.993 1.973   1.991 2.038 
 (0.337)  (0.391)  (0.758)  (0.525) 
 [0.003]  [0.000]  [0.009]  [0.000] 
 
Test of difference between 
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Table 10. Estimated returns to years of schooling  H S  and  C S  for Germany. Dependent 
variable: Δlog hourly wage. Senior workers only 
        
















Years of schooling  H S   0.107 0.110 0.141 0.170 
 (0.019)  (0.064)  (0.045)  (0.057) 
 [0.011]  [0.093]  [0.003]  [0.005] 
        
Test of difference between 
East and West (p-value) 
[0.011]  [0.651]  
             
Years of schooling  C S   0.048 0.070 0.169 0.016 
 (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.032)  (0.031) 
 [0.029]  [0.008]  [0.000]  [0.604] 
        
Test of difference between 
East and West (p-value) 
[0.011]  [0.001]  
        
Observations 398  398  398  398 
Notes: each regression includes the level and gender difference of the lagged employment rate and relative population 
rate, a region of residence (West) dummy and age dummies. Clustered country by year of birth standard errors within 
parentheses and p-values within brackets.    39
Table 11. Estimated returns to education. Only countries with the same returns to schooling 
within each area. Dependent variable: Δlog hourly wage. 
 
Panel A: senior workers in the West and East 













Years of schooling  0.051 0.057 0.075 0.053 
  (0.026) (0.009) (0.024) (0.011) 
  [0.054] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
      
Test of difference between 
East and West (p-value) 
[0.842]  [0.369]  
      
Observations  168 389 168 389 
 
 
Panel B: seniors and juniors in Eastern Europe 





Senior Males   Junior Males  
Years of schooling  0.051 0.069 0.075 0.132 
  (0.026) (0.023) (0.024 (0.022) 
  [0.054] [0.003] [0.002 [0.000] 
      
Test of difference between 
East and West (p-value) 
[0.923]  [0.036]  
  168 90 168 90   
Notes: see Table 6   40
Table 12. Estimated returns to education. Senior workers born between 1956 and 1964. 
Dependent variable: Δlog hourly wage. 
 
Panel A: senior workers born between 1956 and 1964 in the West and East 













Years of schooling  0.088 0.039 0.065 0.045 
  (0.028) (0.012) (0.022) (0.015) 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] 
      
Test of difference between 
East and West (p-value) 
[0.077]  [0.404]  
      
Observations  158 339 158 339 
 
 
Panel B: seniors born between 1956 and 1964 and juniors in Eastern Europe 





Senior Males   Junior Males  
Years of schooling  0.088 0.056 0.065 0.116 
  (0.028) (0.015) (0.022) (0.018) 
  [0.002] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] 
      
Test of difference between 
East and West (p-value) 
[0.220]  [0.035]  
  158 138 158 138 
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Table 13. Public educational expenditure as share of GDP. Eastern Europe. 1990 and 2005 
                 
   1990  2005 























      
Source: World Bank, 2004 and Unesco Statistics  
 
Table 14. Pupil teacher ratio in basic education. Eastern Europe. 1989 and 1997 
                 
   1989  1997 

























      




Table A1. “Between genders” estimation of Table 6.  
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  Seniors East  Seniors West  Juniors East 
      
S  -0.012 0.000  0.061*** 
  (0.025) (0.012) (0.019) 
ΔS  0.066*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 
  (0.020) (0.009) (0.015) 
Unemployment rate  1.162  1.313  4.342*** 
 (1.872)  (1.446)  (1.467) 
Δ Unemployment rate  -0.627  1.039  -2.633*** 
 (1.069)  (0.973)  (0.705) 
Log activity rate  0.610  -0.327  -0.440 
 (0.538)  (0.327)  (1.438) 
Δ Log activity rate  -0.031  -0.139  0.452 
 (0.354)  (0.338)  (0.729) 
Log relative population  -0.084  -0.050  -0.782*** 
 (0.126)  (0.177)  (0.266) 
Δ log relative population  0.515  1.297*  0.936** 
 (0.414)  (0.666)  (0.439) 
Low parental education  -0.421**  -0.047  0.008 
 (0.168)  (0.182)  (0.143) 
Δ Low parental education  0.134  -0.049  -0.097 
 (0.118)  (0.168)  (0.106) 
Log GDP per head at age 10  0.100  0.073  -0.155 
  (0.147) (0.152) (0.110) 
     
Observations 258  519  138 
R-squared 0.619  0.481  0.705 
Notes: each regression includes the country dummies, age dummies and country by year dummies. Clustered country by 
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